The ��It��s the certainly Law�� campaign underscores another tactic used by the industry: developing ��youth smoking prevention�� efforts that are, in fact, a means of industry self-preservation. By analyzing U.S. tobacco documents made public through the MSA, researchers have shown that the industry��s ubiquitous ��We Card�� program was created for two reasons: to improve the industry��s image, and to undermine regulation and the enforcement of existing laws (Apollonio & Malone, 2010). In fact, documents suggested not only that the industry did not intend for the program to be effective but that it has not reduced sales to minors, despite industry claims to the contrary (Apollonio & Malone, 2010). These findings are particularly concerning, as similar programs have been developed in Canada, the United Kingdom, and Latin America (Imperial Tobacco Canada, 2012; Operation ID UK, n.
d.; Sebri�� & Glantz, 2007). Tobacco retailers also have filed legal challenges to restrictions, and it is possible that retailers have received industry support in such litigation (DiFranza & Rigotti, 1999). DiFranza and Rigotti (1999) describe a case in which a retailer facing a U.S. $100 civil fine hired an attorney to mount a vigorous defense, which questioned the ��chain of possession�� of the evidence (i.e., a cigarette pack). The authors note that ��[the] legal expense for this defence [sic] cannot be financially justified to avoid a $100 fine and raises the suspicion that this undertaking was financed by an entity with an interest in weakening enforcement efforts�� (DiFranza & Rigotti, 1999, p.
154). To preempt industry efforts to avoid minor access restrictions, countries can look to the substantial body of research documenting the effects of interventions against the sale of tobacco to minors. Although prior reviews questioned whether these interventions do, in fact, reduce youth smoking, a recent comprehensive review of the literature concluded that interventions that successfully disrupt the sale of tobacco to youth can be expected to reduce Carfilzomib youth smoking (DiFranza, 2012). DiFranza (2012) argues that prior reviews did not distinguish between interventions that failed to disrupt the commercial distribution of tobacco (e.g., those that enacted laws but did not enforce them, those that relied entirely on merchant education) and those that successfully disrupted sales��and, in so doing, created a ��false controversy�� about the effectiveness of youth access interventions.